Relationships between dilemma strength and fixation properties in
  coevolutionary games by Richter, Hendrik
Relationships between dilemma strength and fixation
properties in coevolutionary games
Hendrik Richter
HTWK Leipzig University of Applied Sciences
Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Information Technology
Postfach 301166, D–04251 Leipzig, Germany.
Email: hendrik.richter@htwk-leipzig.de
May 14, 2019
Abstract
Whether or not cooperation is favored over defection in evolutionary games can be assigned by struc-
ture coefficients for any arrangement of cooperators and defectors on any network modeled as a regular
graph. We study how these structure coefficients relate to a scaling of dilemma strength in social dilemma
games. It is shown that some graphs permit certain arrangements of cooperators and defectors to possess
particularly large structure coefficients. Moreover, these large coefficients imply particularly large sections
of a bounded parameter plane spanned by scaling gamble–intending and risk–averting dilemma strength.
1 Introduction
A fundamental issue in understanding evolutionary dynamics of biological systems is the interplay between
competition and cooperation. Evolutionary dynamics requires Darwinian selection in which biological en-
tities compete in terms of survival and reproduction. But while we certainly observe competition in living
entities, juxtaposed and intertwined with it, we also notice very frequently unselfish, altruistic and coopera-
tive behavior. The paradox of competition and cooperation next to each other can be resolved by presuming
that there must be situations where in evolutionary terms cooperation is more advantageous than competi-
tion. Mathematical models for discussing these questions are provided by evolutionary game theory, which
gives a theoretical framework and a bio–inspired computational paradigm [3, 7].
Studying the emergence of cooperation crystallizes into a well–defined form by considering so–called social
dilemma games. In an evolutionary type of these games a population of players interacts in a predefined
manner among themselves by each selecting one of two strategies, cooperate or defect, and receiving a payoff
according to these selections. By converting the payoff into accumulable fitness, repeating the interaction
and allowing players to change strategies depending on the accumulated fitness, the long–term effect of
strategy selection becomes visible [2, 4, 6, 17]. A frequently studied question of considerable biological
relevance is whether or not one strategy is favored over another depending on the values of the payoff
matrix and on the structure of the interaction network specifying who–plays–whom [5, 6, 11, 12]. Recently,
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and independent from each other, two proposals have been made to formalize strategy selection and payoff
allocation, on the one hand, and strategy distribution over interaction networks, on the other hand. Wang et
al. [18] introduced an approach of universal scaling for payoff matrices that facilitates to study a continuum
of social dilemmas including (but not restricted to) well–known examples such as the Prisoners dilemma
(PD), the stag hunt (SH) and the snow drift (SD) game. Chen et al. [5] presented a scheme to define
structure coefficients for any arrangement of cooperators and defectors on interaction networks modelled
as regular graphs. In this paper, these recent additions to evolutionary game theory are combined. There
are simple algebraic relations between structure coefficients, the elements of any payoff matrix and whether
or not cooperation is favored over defection [5, 16]. Thus, we can study fixation properties across the
universal scaling for payoff matrices and dilemma strength. The paper is structured as follows. In Sec. 2 we
briefly review coevolutionary games, particularly highlighting the scaling of dilemma strength [18] as well as
configurations and structure coefficients [5, 11, 12]. Numerical results are presented for different interaction
networks modeled as regular graphs. It is shown how different networks may entail different combinations
of dilemma strength where cooperation is favored over defection.
2 Game description
2.1 Coevolutionary games, payoff matrices and scaling for the dilemma strength
We consider coevolutionary games of N players I = (I1, I2, . . . , IN ). The game has 2 strategies, cooperate
(Ci) and defect (Di) and each pairwise interaction between 2 players Ii and Ij , i 6= j, (which thus are
mutual coplayers) yields a payoff. A (possibly varying) interaction network describes which player interacts
with whom, while the number of coplayers is the same for all players. We need three entities for describing
such a game: (i) the network of interaction, (ii) the configuration describing the strategy of each player, and
(iii) the payoff matrix [8, 9, 10].
The interaction network is given by an undirected graph G = (V,E) and specifies who–plays–whom.
According to evolutionary graph theory [1, 13, 14], the set of vertices V equals the set of players I and
the set of edges E shows which players are mutual coplayers, see Fig. 1 for examples. As each players has
k coplayers, the interaction network is a k–regular graph. The configuration pi = (pi1pi2 . . . piN ) specifies
the strategy pii ∈ {Ci, Di} of each player Ii, (i = 1, 2, . . . , N). With 2 strategies (Ci and Di) there are
2N configurations. These configurations enumerate all possible arrangements of cooperators and defectors
among the players. Additionally, the configurations describe any outcome of a player changing its strategy
in a strategy updating process, for instance death–birth (DB) or birth–death (BD) updating [1, 13, 19]. It
is convenient to binary code the strategies {Ci, Di} → {1, 0}, thus having a binary string to specify the
strategies of all players [5, 10]. As an example, see Fig. 1(a) with the configuration pi = (1000 0000 1110)
showing players I1,I9, I10 and I11 cooperating, while the remaining 8 players defect.
The 2× 2 payoff matrix is (Cj Dj
Ci R S
Di T P
)
(1)
where T is temptation to defect, R is reward for mutual cooperation, P is punishment for mutual defection,
and S is sucker payoff for cooperating with a defector. According to the values and order of these 4 elements
of the payoff matrix (1), we obtain different social dilemma games. Several suggestions have been made to
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Figure 1: Examples of interaction networks: (a)–(d) cubic (3–regular) and (e)–(h) quartic (4–regular) graphs. Two
graph are named: (a),(b) the Frucht graph, (e),(f) the Chvatal graph. The other two graphs have particularly large
maximal structure coefficients σ(pi) = σmax for some configurations pi. A red vertex is a cooperator (pii = 1), while a
grey vertex is a defector (pii = 0). The values of σmax are shown for: (a),(c),(e),(f) c(pi) = 4 cooperators; (b),(d),(f),(h)
c(pi) = 5 cooperators.
rescale the payoff matrix (1) by freezing or linearly coupling its elements, which may reduce the 4–dimensional
parameter space to a 2–dimensional plane [15, 18, 19], while preserving frequently–studied social dilemmas
such as prisoner’s dilemma (PD), snowdrift (SD), stag–hunt (SH), or harmony (H). Following Wang et
al. [18], we consider two scaling parameters for the dilemma strength u and v to obtain a rescaled payoff
matrix ( Cj Dj
Ci R P − (R− P )v
Di R+ (R− P )u P
)
(2)
with u = T−RR−P and v =
P−S
R−P . We may interpret u as gamble–intending dilemma strength and v as risk–
averting dilemma strength. The rescaling (2) requires R > P , while T − R and P − S may change sign to
have different orders of (T,R, P, S), and thus different social dilemmas. Apparently, matrix (2) reduces to
matrix (1) by inserting u and v. However, by varying u and v for −1 ≤ u ≤ 1 and −1 ≤ v ≤ 1, we may
traverse a bounded two–dimensional uv–parameter plane encompassing all the social dilemmas given above,
but also some intermediate forms, see Fig. 2(a). We obtain SD games for 0 ≤ u ≤ 1 and −1 ≤ v ≤ 0, PD
games for 0 ≤ u ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ v ≤ 1, and so on. Thus, a rescaling by matrix (2) significantly eases analyzing
the games across social dilemmas. A square in the uv–plane generalizes the payoff matrix (1) and produces
a multitude of dilemmas that are significant and interesting in evolutionary game theory. Moreover, Wang
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Figure 2: (a) Schematic description of social dilemmas in a uv–parameter plane, as defined by the rescaled
payoff matrix (2). The plane can be divided into four sections (identified by different colors) which correspond
to prisoner’s dilemma (PD), snowdrift (SD), stag hunt (SH), and harmony (H) games. Condition (5) implies
straight lines u = σ(pi)−1−v from north–west to south–east in the uv–plane for which cooperation is favored
over defection below these lines. (b) The structure coefficient of a single cooperator (4) for different number
of players N over the number of coplayers k. The structure coefficient σ falls rapidly for k increasing, which
means an increasing number of coplayers reduces the sections in uv–plane where cooperation is favored over
defection, see Fig. 2(a).
et al. [18] have shown that by the rescaling (2) fixation properties of the games over the uv–plane are fairly
robust with respect to the choice of R and P .
2.2 Fixation properties, configurations and structure coefficients
Recently, Chen et al. [5] have shown that for 2×2 games with N players, payoff matrix (1), any configuration
pi of cooperators and defectors and for any interaction network modeled by a simple, connected, k–regular
graph, in the case of weak selection strategy Ci is favored over Di if
σ(pi) >
T − S
R− P . (3)
The quantity σ(pi) is called the structure coefficient of the configuration pi implying that it may have different
values for different arrangements of cooperators and defectors described by pi. It generalizes the structure
coefficient
σ =
(k + 1)N − 4k
(k − 1)N (4)
applying to a single cooperator [5, 16], see Fig. 2(b) with curves of σ for some N and k. For the rescaled
payoff matrix (2) the condition (3) simplifies to
σ(pi) > 1 + u+ v. (5)
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Condition (5) depends linearly on the scaling parameters for dilemma strength −1 ≤ u ≤ 1 and −1 ≤ v ≤ 1,
but not on the parameter of the payoff matrix (1) and particularly not on R and P . Obtaining such a
simple algebraic expression as to whether or not cooperation is favored over defection over the whole uv–
plane expressing all major social dilemmas is another advantage of the rescaling with payoff matrix (2), as
compared to other types of rescaling [15, 19].
The structure coefficient σ(pi) can be calculated with time complexity O(k2N) for weak selection, the
interaction graph G = (V,E) also describing the replacement structure, and DB updating:
σ(pi) =
N (1 + 1/k)ω1 · ω0 − 2ω10 − ω1ω0
N (1− 1/k)ω1 · ω0 + ω1ω0 . (6)
The local frequencies ω1, ω0, ω10, ω1ω0 can be interpreted as follows [5, 11, 12]. Suppose a random walk is
carried out with the starting vertex chosen uniformly–at–random on a given interaction network. The local
frequency ω1 (or ω0 = 1−ω1) is the probability that for a configuration pi the player at the first step of the
walk is a cooperator (or defector). The local frequency ω10 is the probability that for a walk with 2 steps
the player at the first step is a cooperator and at the second step it is a defector. The local frequency ω1ω0
is the probability that for 2 random walks independent of each other the player at the first step on the first
walk is a cooperator, but at the first step on the second walk is a defector.
3 Numerical results and discussion
We next present and discuss numerical results for the interaction networks given in Fig. 1. As shown above,
condition (5) depends linearly on the scaling parameters for dilemma strength u and v yielding straight lines
with u = σ(pi) − 1 − v from north–west to south–east in the uv–parameter plane, see Fig. 2(a). Such a
straight line is the more towards the north–east corner, the larger the structure coefficient σ(pi) is. In other
words, the largest σ(pi) = σmax gives the largest section in the bounded uv–plane generalizing elements of
the payoff matrix for which cooperation is favored over defection, while the smallest σ(pi) = σmin gives the
smallest section. We first briefly look at how the structure coefficients are distributed for each number of
cooperators c(pi), see Fig. 3 for the Frucht (k = 3) and the Chvatal (k = 4) graph. We notice that for 1
cooperator (c(pi) = 1) and 1 defector (c(pi) = N − 1 = 11) we get the single values σ = {3/2, 11/9} obtained
for a single cooperator according to Eq. (4). For 2 ≤ c(pi) ≤ 10 we obtain a symmetric distribution with
some values of σ(pi) larger and some smaller than σ, depending on the arrangement of cooperators and
defectors on the evolutionary graph. This means there are for the same number of cooperators c(pi) some
configurations pi that are more prone to cooperation than others.
The main result is given by Fig. 4, which shows for the interaction networks given in Fig. 1 the sections
of condition u < σ(pi) − 1 − v between the maximal and minimal structure coefficients, σ(pi) = σmax and
σ(pi) = σmin for the number of cooperators 2 ≤ c(pi) ≤ 6 (the results for 7 ≤ c(pi) ≤ 10 are omitted as
they are symmetric, see Fig. 3). Different graphs yield different σmin and σmax for each c(pi), which in
turn produce different ranges in the uv–plane indicating that cooperation is favored or not. For instance,
the interaction graph given in Fig. 1(d) has for c(pi) = 5 cooperators the largest value σmax = 1.9159. For
this configuration pi cooperation prevails for almost all SD and SH games and a considerable fraction of PD
games, see the green–yellow line in Fig. 4(b). Comparing the interaction graphs reveals that the lower line
defined by σmin is the same (or almost the same) for the examples considered, while the upper line is not
and gives the largest range for the graph and configuration in Fig. 1(d). However, comparing k = 3 and
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Figure 3: Distributions of the structure coefficients σ(pi) for graphs: (a) Frucht, Fig. 1(a); (b) Chvatal, Fig.
1(e). The blue lines intersecting the distributions show the values σ = {3/2, 11/9} obtained for a single
cooperator with N = 12, k = {3, 4} and Eq. (4).
k = 4 shows that the upper and lower lines are more in favor for cooperation for k = 3 than for k = 4, which
is a consequence of the structure coefficient for a single cooperatorσ with σmin ≤ σ ≤ σmax being smaller for
k = 4 as for k = 3, see Fig. 2(b). Compare also to Fig. 3 showing that for all configurations the structure
coefficients σ(pi) for the Frucht graph (k = 3) are larger than for the Chvatal graph (k = 4). A recent work
suggests that it is general result for regular interaction graphs that structure coefficients fall for the degree
k (= number of coplayers) of the graph getting larger [11, 12].
4 Conclusions
Different types of social dilemma games such as Prisoners dilemma, stag–hunt or snow–drift can be univer-
sally expressed by a scaling of dilemma strength. We have considered structure coefficients defined for each
configuration describing any arrangement of cooperators and defectors on a regular evolutionary graphs. As
these structure coefficients are linked to whether or not cooperation is favored over defection, we could study
how the universal scaling of dilemma strength relates to specific favorable configurations of cooperators and
defectors. The main findings are that some graphs permit certain arrangements of cooperators and defectors
to possess particularly large structure coefficients. Moreover, these large coefficients imply particularly large
sections of a bounded parameter plane spanned by scaling gamble–intending and risk–averting dilemma
strength. In addition, the sections can be described by linear inequalities depending only on the two scaling
parameters.
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Figure 4: Sections of condition u < σ(pi) − 1 − v between the maximal and minimal structure coefficients,
σ(pi) = σmax and σ(pi) = σmin for the interaction networks given in Fig. 1 for the number of cooperators
2 ≤ c(pi) ≤ 6. The bars give the range of the condition u < σ(pi)− 1− v between σmax and σmin according
to the color code for each number of cooperators c(pi). The black line indicates the section for a single
cooperator with σ according to Eq. (4).
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